Real Property: Cause of Actoin for Unjust Enrichment Upheld after Cancellation of Contract for Deed by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1970
Real Property: Cause of Actoin for Unjust
Enrichment Upheld after Cancellation of Contract
for Deed
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Real Property: Cause of Actoin for Unjust Enrichment Upheld after Cancellation of Contract for
Deed" (1970). Minnesota Law Review. 2970.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2970
1152
Case Comment
Real Property: Cause of Action For Unjust Enrichment
Upheld After Cancellation of Contract for Deed
Pursuant to a real estate contract, plaintiff vendee made
payments to defendant vendors amounting to $500,000 of the
$2,700,000 purchase price. Plaintiff defaulted and defendants
cancelled the contract, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
559.21.1 Plaintiff, claiming that the $500,000 exceeded defend-
ants' actual damages, sued on the grounds of unjust enrichment. 2
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota
law allows a cause of action for unjust enrichment after a real
estate contract has been effectively cancelled, but that the plain-
tiff had failed to prove that the defendants had been unjustly
enriched. Zirinsky v. Sheehan, 413 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1969).
The contract for deed in Minnesota has been likened to a
"thirty day time bomb" due to the finality with which interests
are cut off by its cancellation. 3 It was created in 18974 to allevi-
ate the harsh forfeitures which existed under Minnesota common
law.5 The statute provides that no contract for the sale of real
estate may be cancelled without nolice to the vendee followed
by a thirty day period in which the vendee may cure the de-
fault.6
Statutory cancellation of a land contract is not the vendor's
1. When default is made in the conditions of any contract for
the conveyance of real estate or any interest therein, whereby
the vendor has a right to terminate the same, he may do so by
serving upon the purchaser, his personal representatives or
assigns, either within or without the state, a notice specifying the
conditions in which default has been :made, and stating that such
contract will terminate 30 days after the service of such notice
unless prior thereto the purchaser shall comply with such con-
ditions and pay the cost of service ....
MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (1967).
2. The district court, in an unreported opinion, held that the plain-
tiff was not entitled to the return of any monies paid under the contract.
3. Northwest Hotel Corp. v. Henderson, 257 Minn. 87, 100 N.W.2d
493 (1959).
4. Ch. 223, [1897] Laws of Minn. 431.
5. At common law, contracts for the sale of real estate could be
cancelled immediately upon the default of the vendee, without notice,
providing time had been made of the essence. Grant v. Munch, 54
Minn. 111, 55 N.W. 902 (1893). If time was not of the essence, the
vendor was required to give the vendee a reasonable time, after default,
to make payment. Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5
MnN. L. REv. 329, 345 (1921); see Graceville State Bank v. Hofschild,
166 Minn. 58, 206 N.W. 948 (1926).
6. See note 1 supra.
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sole remedy when the vendee defaults but it is the remedy most
frequently used.7 The principal reason for the use of statutory
cancellation is that the rights of the vendee are destroyed and
all payments made under the contract are forfeited. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court has consistently held that a defaulting ven-
dee, whose contract has been effectively cancelled, has no right
to a refund of any payments made under the contract, either
at law or equity, regardless of the hardships which occasioned
the default.8 The only exception to this rule is where the con-
tract was negotiated and procured through the vendor's fraud
or misrepresentation.9 The vendee is then allowed to recover
his payments if he could have obtained rescission prior to the
cancellation proceedings.' 0
In Zirinsky, the default was occasioned by plaintiff's inabil-
ity to complete his financing arrangements.'1 As is customary
in Minnesota real estate practice, defendants then cancelled the
contract pursuant to statute. The court easily concluded that
the contract had been properly cancelled and that no cause of ac-
tion could subsequently be based on the contract.' 2 The court
then proceeded to hold that an action for unjust enrichment is
not based on the contract and therefore is a valid cause of action
under Minnesota law.
The court, in attempting to follow Minnesota law,' 3 has mis-
7. Other remedies which are available to the vendor include:
specific performance, Henschke v. Young, 224 Minn. 339, 28 N.W.2d 766(1947), Noyes v. Brown, 142 Minn. 211, 171 N.W. 803 (1919); action for
the price, Noyes v. Brown, id.; foreclosure of vendor's lien, Robitshek
v. Maetzold, 198 Minn. 586, 270 N.W. 579 (1936); and damages for
breach of contract, Home Counsellors, Inc. v. Folta, 246 Minn. 481, 75
N.W.2d 417 (1956), Wilson v. Hoy, 120 Minn. 451, 139 N.W. 817 (1913).
However, once cancellation has been effected, the vendor may not elect
an additional or alternative remedy. Olson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 126
Minn. 229, 148 N.W. 67 (1914); Smith v. Dristig, 176 Minn. 601, 224 N.W.
157 (1929).
8. The Minnesota Supreme Court has said, "A vendee in default
cannot, by the great weight of authority, maintain an action in quasi
contract or otherwise to recover payments made." Miller v. Snedeker,
257 Minn. 204, 217, 101 N.W.2d 213, 223-24 (1960). See also Andre-
sen v. Simon, 171 Minn. 168, 213 N.W. 563 (1927); Nelson Real Estate
Agency v. Seeman, 147 Minn. 354, 180 N.W. 227 (1920); Citizens State
Bank v. Moebeck, 143 Minn. 291, 173 N.W. 853 (1919); Note, Minnesota
Land Contract Law in Action, 39 MIEN. L. REv. 93 (1954).
9. See Olson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 126 Minn. 229, 148 N.W. 67
(1914).
10. Id.
11. 413 F.2d. at 483.
12. Id. at 484.
13. Id. Zirinsky was in the federal courts by reason of diversity
of citizenship. Therefore, it was the court's responsibility to decide the
case under Minnesota law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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apprehended the law as interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. Not one of the authorities relied on in Zirinsky will sup-
port the court's position.14 The Zirinsky court apparently at-
tempted to avoid the Minnesota rule by avoiding the cases ruling
directly on the point and substituting reasoning from more gen-
eral principles. First, the court pointed out that statutory can-
cellation destroys the contract and concluded that the vendor
may not, therefore, justify the retention of payments by any
liquidated damages clause.15 Having concluded that the contract
cannot support a retention of payments, the court noted at some
length that forfeiture of money paid in excess of damages is not
a favored result in Minnesota. 1 This is undoubtedly an ac-
curate statement in the abstract but it ignores the view of the
Minnesota court that a vendee who has thirty days after notice
of termination in which to remove the default is not the victim
of a harsh forfeiture provision.17 The Zirinsky court then noted
that the action for unjust enrichment, when statutory cancella-
tion has been effected, has precedent in Minnesota. However,
while it did recognize that each of the cases cited for this propo-
sition involved fraud by the vendor, it failed to note that fraud
14. The following are the cases on which the court relied for the
proposition that Minnesota law will support an action for unjust en-
richment. Following each case is the factor which removes it from the
proposition which the court stated. Cady v. Bush, 283 Minn. 105, 166
N.W.2d 358 (1969). This case was an action for unjust enrichment re-
sulting from the cancellation of a contract for the sale of real estate. The
Minnesota Supreme Court found that since there was no actionable fraud
a cause of action for unjust enrichment could not be maintained. Ga-
ble v. Niles Holding Co., 209 Minn. 445, 296 N.W. 525 (1941). In this
case the cause of action was allowed because of the fraud which had
induced the vendee to enter into the contract. The court specifically
noted that for an action predicated on unjust enrichment to be successful
there must have been sufficient fraud to allow the vendee to rescind
the contract, had he acted prior to the cancellation. Olson v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 126 Minn. 229, 148 N.W. 67 (1914). The court said that money
paid under a contract tainted by fraud might be recoverable by an ac-
tion for money had and received.
15. It is interesting to note that, in a rather strange turnabout, the
court later attempted to justify the action for unjust enrichment with
cases involving a finding that a liquidated damages clause may con-
stitute a penalty. 413 F.2d at 486-87.
16. Id.
17. Miller v. Snedeker, 257 Minn. 204, 101 N.W.2d 213 (1960);
Nelson Real Estate Agency v. Seeman, 147 Minn. 354, 180 N.W. 227
(1920). That the forefeiture feature of the contract for deed is by de-
sign rather than by accident is shown by the fact that the legislature
restricted the forefeiture feature during the depression and then later
reinstated it. Compare Ch. 422 [1933] :Laws of Minn. 798, with MAlm.
STAT. § 559.21 (1967).
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is required for an exception to the general rule. s The court
finally concluded that there is an action for unjust enrichment
when money is "wrongfully held" by the vendor.' 9
The only explanation for the decision is that the court
wished to express its disapproval of the forfeiture aspect of the
contract for deed. 20 Such a reaction would be completely under-
standable because of the often harsh consequences of allowing
the vendor to retain all payments.2' Nevertheless, the law in
Minnesota has always been that the vendor retains payments
regardless of the hardship involved. 22
It is somewhat difficult to make firm conclusions about
Zirinsky because of the strong tendency to be drawn into a dis-
cussion of the substantive merits of Minnesota contract for deed
law. This is a complex and hotly contested question involving
various conflicting interests.23 This question, however, was sup-
posedly not at issue in Zirinsky. The court did not claim to
change Minnesota law nor did it assert that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court would change the law if it were to reexamine the
question. In holding that the vendee in a contract for deed may
recover payments made in excess of the actual damages, the
Zirinsky court is wrong, and the decision stands unsupported by
Minnesota law.
18. See note 9 supra. No mention was made by the court of any
fraud on the part of the vendor or any other circumstance which could
cause this case not to be covered by the general rule.
19. 413 F.2d at 490. A possible explanation of what the court meant
by "wrongfully held" was not forthcoming.
20. The court was clearly not motivated to deviate from established
state law by sympathy for the particular plaintiff in this case. This is
made apparent by the fact that after ruling that the cause of action was
valid, the court held that the plaintiff had not proven his damages and
denied recovery.
21. Ballantine, supra note 5, at 345; Vanneman, Strict Foreclosures
on Land Contracts, 14 MTmx. L. REV. 342 (1929); Note, supra note 8.
22. Nelson Real Estate Agency v. Seeman, 147 Minn. 354, 180 N.W.
227 (1920).
23. It is quite obvious that by effecting a cancellation of a con-
tract for deed the vendor of real estate is capable of reaping great
financial benefits, as he retains the ownership of the land as well as
payments made pursuant to the contract prior to cancellation. On the
other hand the complete termination of all rights upon the effective
cancellation of the contract adds a sense of certainty to contract for deed
transactions. The vendee is protected by the thirty day period during
which he is allowed to remove the default by merely paying the
amount which is in default, if he can. See text accompanying note 17
supra. He is additionally protected by the rule which allows him to
recover payments if the contract was procured by fraud on the part of
the vendor. Note, supra note 8.
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